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Abstract:
This article seeks to integrate insights from the philosophy of
history to support the continued use of the historical-critical method in
biblical studies. Though the historical-critical method has been muchmaligned within biblical criticism over the past seventy years, this essay
attempts to demonstrate the value of investigating ancient Israel’s past as
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Since the last half of the twentieth century, many biblical
interpreters have become reticent toward the procedures and aims of
historical-critical scholarship. Such interpreters include postmodern
biblical critics, rhetorical critics, and adherents to the so-called “canonical
approach,” among others. While the skepticism toward historical criticism
has come primarily within the realm of biblical theology,1 it has also
extended to the secular, descriptive task. Although these interpreters, with
their distinct approaches and methodologies, diverge on several important
points,2 they share a hesitancy to attribute much, if any, interpretational
value to the historical-critical paradigms. Leo G. Perdue traces this cynicism
within biblical studies, the so-called “collapse of history,” to dubious
philosophical underpinnings, the fragmentation of theological approaches,
the failures of modernity, a rejection of the descriptive approach by
some, the rise of postmodernism, and history’s failure to speak for many
different ideological voices (1994: 4–11).3 In shying away from historical
criticism, these varying viewpoints of the biblical text have produced fresh,
the biblical text.
Yet traditional historical-critical scholarship of the Bible, including
the various approaches subsumed within it, persists.4 Its interpreters
continue to peer back behind the words of the biblical text to discover the
meanings of those words and the historical world to which those words
debates about corroboration with the biblical witness, and they continue
to reveal more about the social, cultural, and religious world of those who
lived in biblical times. Source and textual critics persevere in postulating
texts and traditions behind the present form of the text. Those operating
compelling, but many times they do not. Others still see the entire enterprise
as futile.
Indeed, practitioners of traditional historical criticism have erred
and have needed correction,5 but this essay will attempt to demonstrate that
we should not throw the proverbial baby out with the bathwater. Historical
6

Yet its practitioners must proceed responsibly to avoid the incredulity of
interpreters from the latter camp. In the space I have been gifted here, I
will utilize insights from the philosophy of history7 to suggest guidelines for
practitioners of biblical historical criticism to continue with caution, while
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nonetheless offering constructive guidelines for a historical study of the
Bible. I hope that incorporating insights from philosophers and professional
historians who have pondered how we can meaningfully reconstruct the
past within the discipline of the philosophy of history, an interdisciplinary
stratagem not often taken in the defense of biblical historical criticism
(Younger 1999:304),8 will help to provide a foundation upon which we can
build a useful and appropriate historical investigation of the Bible.9 Indeed,
biblical historical criticism has its roots in the professional study of history
and a deeper dive into the general discipline of history should be helpful. I
attempt here to set forth principles that avoid the kind of reckless practice
of historical criticism which has, in recent years, created an aversion to this
approach.
We begin by looking to how, given its many critiques, historical
criticism ought
to be effective, operate with respect towards their subjects, with attention
to narrative form and the historian’s biases, with caution toward historical
boundaries, and with a large, diverse network of peers. Next, we will show
how historical criticism operates at the logical level, an element often
overlooked by its opponents. Finally, we will examine the why of historical
raison de etre.
Historical Respect
A common criticism leveled against traditional historical criticism
is its arrogance. In this perception, historical criticism stands at an objective
tools to make correct judgments about the past.10 It resists the foundations

histories they write.11
Most readers of biblical criticism will be able to sympathize with
such claims. Many of us have read the works of biblical historians and
wondered where they bought their time machines and historical mindconclusions that otherwise remain under intense debate. Others seamlessly
deduce the motivations of historical characters, who have been dead for
thousands of years.12 In viewing some historical conclusions that appear
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off-putting in their hubris and omniscient mood, it is clear to see why many
potential students have turned from studying the Bible’s past.
To assuage some of these objections to historical criticism,
we begin with the common assumption that historical study, and by
extension historical criticism, functions in the same manner as the natural
discipline is a philosophical straw man. Although rises in the discipline
of ancient Greece or the Enlightenment, such correlation does not lead
and the natural sciences is not assumed by historians, but is very much
an ongoing conversation, with practitioners often acknowledging both the
convergences and the distinctions. R.G. Collingwood, who worked both as
a historian and a philosopher, recognizes that history is a science in so far
as it is an “organized body of knowledge” (2014: 249).13 For him, history’s
shares with the natural sciences an interest in evidence and interpretation
through the boundaries of a critical method. Yet, for Collingwood, history’s
interpretations have a different goal than the natural sciences’ concern
for the physical objects of space and time. History’s aim is human selfknowledge, which overlaps, not only with natural sciences, but also with
philosophy and art.14 Patrick Gardiner and Isaiah Berlin are notable among
those thinkers who similarly acknowledge history’s intersections with
natural science while underscoring its interest in particular human events,
which is opposed to the natural sciences’ preoccupation with generalizing
rules (Gardiner 1961: 60; Berlin 1960: 1–31).15 Biblical historians also
wrestle with distinctions and intersections between history and science,
the philosophy of history (Provan, et. al. 2003: 42). I will not belabor the
point, only note that blanket statements of historical criticism as rooted in
their work as a related, but not identical, body of knowledge to the natural
sciences.
Moreover, because historical criticism is a human-centered
activity (see the conclusion below), it is the responsibility of the historical
interpreter to treat historical characters as subjects. That is, the historian
ought to put forth an effort to understand historical persons and the world
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in which they lived. As historians, we are in the wrong to presume thoughts
can about that person and the historical context (Berlin 1960: 26–27).16 We
must enter into historical inquiry with fear and trembling, recognizing the
chasm between ourselves and actors of the past, knowing that we study
them and their time from a murky distance, but that it is also our duty to
allow them to speak as products of their time and as fellow human beings.
Mark Day contends the historian must operate with charity, beginning with
a default stance of openness to the historical person, assuming her or his
reasonableness in acting in or testifying to a historical event. Although
historical actors are capable of lying, bias, and irrational behavior, such
a posture provides “constraint on the interpretation of others” while
also bearing in mind that further evidence may press the interpreter into
skepticism of that actor’s thought or claim (2008: 148–149).
In recognizing the temporal distance from our historical objects,
especially within the discipline of biblical studies where the temporal
distance is so great, it is imperative that we understand our subjects within
their own historical contexts. That is, we must rigorously study the thought
world and society of biblical authors and characters. We are compelled to
know as much Greek, Hebrew, and Aramaic as possible. We must study the
political landscape of the ancient Near East and the Greco-Roman world.
We must familiarize ourselves with archaeological data and sociological
models. We study these areas of knowledge, not to know the biblical world
better than those who lived in it, but to attempt to be sympathetic to them.
To construct, as much as we can, the worldview of the ancients is to admit
that the particular topic a historian may study does not arise in a vacuum,
but within a complex network of understanding. The responsible historian
will attempt to make use of the concepts of her or his subjects, not the
historian’s own subjects (Day 2008: 137–144).17 Perdue, who otherwise
downplays the use of historical criticism in Old Testament theology,
concedes that historical context assists the interpreter in understanding
meaning, and will continue to provide a fruitful dimension of historicalcritical study (1994: 303–304).18
historical subjects as foundational, not only as a cog of the historiographical
method, but to the discipline of history as a whole. He writes,
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When all is said and done, a single word, “understanding,”
is the beacon of light of our studies. Let us not say
that the true historian is a stranger to emotion: he has
that, at all events. “Understanding,” in all honesty, is
Moreover, it is a friendly word. Even in action, we are
far too prone to judge. It is so easy to denounce. We
from us— a foreigner or a political adversary— is almost
inevitably considered evil. A little more understanding
of people would be necessary merely for guidance, in
present them while there is yet time. If history would
only renounce its false archangelic airs, it would help
us to cure this weakness. It includes a vast experience of
human diversities, a continuous contact with men. Life,
like science, has everything to gain from it, if only these
contacts be friendly. (2017: 134–135)
Bloch’s statement becomes more profound, and more urgent, when we
His death at the hands of those infamous for their “misunderstanding”
underscores how the world needs more understanding, whether with
respect to our own time or the past. History is a discipline bound up with
human nature (Bloch 2017: 26–27), and it is our responsibility as biblical
historians to respect the humanness of biblical actors and authors, giving
credence to their world and its events.19
Interpretation
The aspect of historical criticism that undoubtedly witnesses the
most scrutiny within biblical studies is historical interpretation.20 That we
have evidence, testimony, and data concerning the past is doubtful only
to the most radical epistemological skeptics. But making sense of this
information introduces a host of issues.21 Whose interpretation of historical
realia is best? How would we even begin to claim one interpretation as
better than another? What about the historian’s own biases and worldview?
Is the past as neat and tidy as historians tend to make it? Can we even claim
we know what a historical author was trying to say?
Metahistory alerted historians to their
own perspectives in writing history. For White, our historical explanations
are posterior to our own “linguistic protocols” (1973: 426), which give
shape to historical interpretations. Historians must then be cognizant of
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their own present linguistic stances from which they write about the past.22
Our discipline has certainly suffered from a lack of self-awareness, as recent
subversive approaches have revealed to us.23 Truly, historians of any subject
often remain blind, not only to their linguistic protocols, but to their entire
Weltanschauung, which can even dictate evidence the historian chooses to
include. And in our present social climate, it might be wise for historians to
acknowledge their worldview in order to assist readers who do not know
authors apart from their names on the cover.24
Tangential to the claim about a historian’s limitations in
interpretation is the simplicity with which historians can view historical
phenomena. One thinks of Jean-Fran ois Lyotard’s deconstruction of
modern “metanarratives,”25 and how this is easily appropriated in critiques
of modern historiography (Ankersmit 1989: 148). In Old Testament
theology, the twentieth century witnessed the rise and fall of theologies
that attempted to describe ancient Israel’s conception of God in a singular
manner.26 But many practicing historians resist simplistic explanations of
historical phenomena. Richard J. Evans claims that historians should be, and
all narratives, whether those of their peers or even those of past testimonies
(1997: 126–127).27 Sarah Maza writes, “Historians often avoid putting
their money on one type of cause over another, instead explaining how
various factors accumulate over time to a point of no return” (2017: 173).
In the same way, historians of the Bible ought to defy naïve, overarching
explanations for historical phenomena and look ever deeper into the
historical world into which they explore.
Part of the strong reaction against simplistic explanations is
the high perch from which they are offered. When taken in tandem
with White’s cautions, postmodernism produces a stark challenge to
any valid historical interpretation. Whether Lyotard’s denouncement of
metanarratives, Foucault’s work on mental illness (1994: 370–376), or
Derrida’s deconstruction of language,28 postmodernism has sought to tear
down the footings of western modes of discourse to make space for new
readings of texts, and especially historical ones. From the postmodern view,
it seems nearly impossible to use the language of the privileged modern
academic historian to speak on behalf of the poor and marginalized
(Jenkins 2000: 191–192).29 Yet, practically speaking, this does not hold true.
Because of the use of modern history, we are able to tell stories of heroes
of our own culture who have subverted the power of their day, such as
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Jarena Lee, Sojourner Truth, Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.30 Evans counteracts
postmodern claims by noting that they divert “attention away from real
suffering and oppression…” (1997: 158).31 In the realm of Old Testament
studies, we are pressed to deal with a subject, ancient Israel, who constantly
witnesses to its existence in an act of liberation from Egypt and who writes
from the perspective of a minor player in the socio-political world of the
ancient Near East, constantly worn down under the hegemony of greater
military and political entities.32 In my estimation, it would be disingenuous
for a biblical historian, in particular, to deny that studying the past in any
organized way prevents us from telling the histories of the powerless.33
And what of the oft-debated question of whether an interpreter
is ever able to discern an author’s intention? The objection to this has its
origins in Wimsatt and Beardsley’s article on the so-called “intentional
fallacy” (1954: 1–18).34 The concept gains steam under the rubrics of
postmodernism, which doubts our ability to make judgments on any author’s
meaning.35 Ironically here, we must point to a matter of authorial intention
to make the counterclaim to objections of authorial intention. Wimstatt and
Beardsley were concerned with poetry, a genre of literature that is often
intentionally unintentional. Poets frequently imbue ambiguity into their
writing and allow for degrees of interpretation. This is not so with historical
records, which attempt to relay a witness or evidence to actions of the past.
For instance, humanity’s earliest writing is found on economic tablets from
Mesopotamia. These short tablets describe transactions between parties for
trade to keep records for these dealings. Room for interpretation here is
minimal. As literary genres, including history, and languages become more
complex, surely authors begin to write more that is unintentional in their
language and more that can often be misconstrued by later readers. Yet
misunderstanding of this kind is a matter of degree, dependent upon literary
genre, temporal distance, knowledge of the historical context in which the
texts were written, and so on. To aver that we can never read intentionality
into the text of another author is nonsense. 36 Yes, we must acknowledge
our distance from the historical subject and the tendencies toward our own
interpretations. But to speak meaningfully about the past and to do so with
the respect of our subjects, we must assume they intended to communicate
meaningfully about the events of their day. This is no simple assumption,
and it requires both self-awareness on the part of the historian to realize her
or his own worldview and a deep study of the historical subject’s worldview.
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We have seen thus far that historiography must not be an arrogant
affair. It necessarily involves a deep engagement with historical actors
and their contexts, not assuming or casting aspersions from a safe distance.
The writing of history entails the hard work of thorough research and a
sympathetic imagination toward the past. It may also include recognition of
our biases and acknowledgement of the perspective from which we write,
but it must involve that we can somehow speak meaningfully about the
past.
37

Boundaries in Historical Interpretation
Although White astutely demonstrated the poignant role of
interpretation in the historical enterprise, this does not mean that historians
are free to interpret as they wish. Rather, the other side of writing history
is dealing with the constraints of evidence. Yes, historical evidence does
into a broader historical picture. But historical evidence—coins, annals,
chronicles, inscriptions, archaeological data, testimony, and more—
provides boundaries for the conclusions historians can make.38 Evidence
does not provide a jumping off point for the historian to use her or his
imagination unfettered. Bloch trenchantly argues, “Explorers of the past are
never quite free. The past is their tyrant. It forbids them to know anything
which it has not itself, consciously or otherwise, yielded to them” (2017:
59).39
In traditional historical criticism, we give priority of place to the
primary sources, those that are more “evidentially reliable” (Day 2008:
and it is a judgment that should not be made rashly.40 Yet before we enter
a later section on historical logic, we should note here Day’s claim that
the historian’s judgment of evidence should be consilient. That is, it should
“account for a wide range of phenomena by postulating fewer hypotheses
that explain the phenomena” (2008: 148–149).41 In short, we ought
to choose the relationship between the evidence at hand that requires
the most simplistic explanation. This tactic yields a more reasonable
explanation with less nuance to create in logical argumentation. This is not
to deny, as mentioned above, that the past can be messier than our typically
monocausal view of the past. That would be, and is often in biblical studies,
the case when evidence from the past is sparse. But our explanations must
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logically work to cohere many levels of causes, and consilience remains
a logical approach in so far as it acknowledges the full range of evidence,
whether primary or secondary, and seeks to paint a fuller picture of the
events of the past.42
For students of the Old Testament, for example, consider the biblical
events describing King Hezekiah. We have at our disposal the narratives of
2 Kings 18–20, Isaiah 36–39, alongside Assyrian Annals, archaeological
data, and realia such as the so-called “Hezekiah coins.”43 These are real
objects and witnesses to events of the late 8th century BCE in Judah, and
we must take them into account when studying this particular time and
place. They indicate to us the following minimal boundaries for historical
interpretation: that a King Hezekiah existed in this period and ruled over
Judah, that there were battles between the Judahites and Assyrians during
Hezekiah’s reign including an attempted invasion of Jerusalem in 701 BCE,
the tiny nation of Judah. It would be a steep uphill climb for a historical
interpreter to argue against such facts. The evidence becomes slightly more
precarious when we consider testimony of these events. For instance,
there are differing versions of why the Assyrian invasion of Jerusalem never
occurred, depending on one’s source. We must also note that the Judahite
scribes further attest a religious reformation in Judah under Hezekiah, a
detailed relationship between Hezekiah and the prophet Isaiah, and a
diplomatic visit from Babylonian envoys. Finally, the place of 2 Kings and
Isaiah within the Old Testament canon ascribes these events to the same
people group who rebuilt the Persian colony of Yehud under the reign of
the Persian King Cyrus. Interpretations of this data range from the so-called
adopted the Judahite story44 to a hermeneutic of historical trust that the
Judahite account of the repulsion of the Assyrian army should be treated
with the same respect as Sennacherib’s own perspective.45 Without drawing
judgments about these interpretations, I hope to show by this example how
historiography is possible from boundary-providing evidence.
The progenitor of the modern historical method, and one who
draws the ire of those skeptical of the modern historical program, is Leopold
von Ranke. The nineteenth-century German historian sought to incorporate
a more rigorous method into the study of history, thus separating it into its
own discipline apart from other academic specializations.46 But what has
become the most polarizing facet of his system is Ranke’s encouragement
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for historians to study the past wie es eigentlich gewesen, or “how it actually
was.” Such a claim seems impossible from the present vantage point. How
can we know what actually happened in the past? But much of our angst
toward Ranke comes, coincidentally, from us imposing our own historical
time on Ranke’s. For one, there is some debate about our common
translation of eigentlich as “actually,” when it could have meant something
along the lines of “essentially” or “properly,” equivalents that would ease the
arrogance of our usual interpretation of that word. But, more importantly,
we must remember that Ranke wrote in the wake of Romanticism (especially
Voltaire), a movement that had little regard for historical evidence and
was keener to take liberties with historical interpretation.47 In essence,

boundaries on fanciful interpretations of the past by carefully respecting the
evidence of the past through an organized Wissenschaft---a Wissenschaft
that was determined to be distinct from other forms of knowledge.48
The Historical Community
Though the discipline of history is a Wissenschaft, it is, as Bloch
states, “a science still in travail” (2017: 185). And part of the enduring
struggle of the discipline of history is that no one work or interpretation of
the past can lay claim to the sole understanding of any one historical event.
differing viewpoints of their work. Such a practice stresses the interpretational
aspect of history. One historian’s triumphant event may be seen as an act of
oppression through the lens of another. One historian’s trust in the historical
veracity of the exodus event is another’s idealized narrative of the postexilic
community. Such conversations enable historians to anticipate objections,
hone their explanatory reasoning, and perhaps even be convicted of seeing
the past a new way.49 The hermeneutics of historical research requires an
ongoing dialogue of the historian with others also familiar with the same
evidence to gain a fuller picture of the past. Therefore, Bloch can assert, “…
historical research will tolerate no autarchy” (2017: 47).
This process for the historian typically involves the tedious
and anxious processes of submitting articles to peer review journals and
presenting papers at academic conferences. But the insecurities of the
historian aside, the input of the scholarly community assists the entire
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discipline at a greater understanding of the past. This is not to say there will
always be historical consensus after enough conversations (indeed, that will
be rare), but that the practice of historiography is, in Day’s appropriation
of Gadamer, “dialogic” (2008: 162–166). In interacting with historical
interpretations in the past and present, historians increase the number of
voices providing input and gain clarity from their initial conclusions, which
are always provisional.50 In their prominent book Telling the Truth about
History, Appleby, Hunt, and Jacob similarly contend that history requires an
epistemological position with “intellectual spirit of democratic scholarship”
(1994: 283) and that it must be “a shared enterprise in which the community
of practitioners acts as a check on the historian…” (1994: 261). Indeed, as
a practice heavily dependent upon interpretation, history is only better for
multiple viewpoints. Diversity within the guild will check much of the past
pitfalls of the discipline we have already discussed, such as monocausal
explanations, Western-only perspectives, and interpretations without
evidential support. Such a conception of historical study militates against a
as a guild rather than individually.
Historical Logic
Final-form, literary analysis of biblical texts has a distinct advantage
of working with materials evident and available to any researcher. The
canonical approach, narrative criticism, and postmodern literary criticism
all deal with the text as it stands before us and has little-to-no need for
getting behind this text.51 Conversely, the historical-critical approach, in
the minds of many in the camps of the former, masquerades as a tactic
to achieve certainty about the historical realities to which texts point. For
instance, Prickett writes regarding the origins of modern historical criticism,
“This quest for historical certainty in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries
was in itself partially the result of an earlier failure… to give theology the
same kind of external certainties as those apparently enjoyed by the natural
sciences in the age of Royal Society and of Newton” (1986: 25). And
historical criticism, postmodernists in particular react to what they perceive
as historical criticism’s search for absolute truth and attempt to poke holes
in such epistemological assumptions.52
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Yet, we must tread lightly in claiming that historical critics search
for absolute certainty. This does not fall within the aim of most, if not all,
practicing historians. Bloch iterates as much when he notes that historical
certainty and universality are “questions of degree” (2017: 17). Tucker
reinforces his arguments with the contention that history writing is the
best explanation of the evidence at hand (2004: 254–262). Day contends
that historical knowledge is both “underdetermined” and “defeasible”
(2008: 148–149).53 Berlin notes that historical language is necessarily
fraught with “such words as plausibility, likelihood, sense of reality, [and]
historical sense” (1960: 30). Evans writes, rather bluntly, “No historians
really believe in the absolute truth of what they are writing, simply in its
probable truth, which they have done their utmost to establish by following
the usual rules of evidence” (1997: 189). We see that Evans, with his
insistence on historians doing “their utmost to establish” the truth, does
not want to denigrate the search for historical knowledge. But he concedes
that an element of probability is necessarily part and parcel of a historical
epistemology. Thus, I think that Evans would agree with the assessment of
Keith Jenkins, his postmodern interlocutor, that the truth of history is elusive
(2000: 193). Yet he would disagree that it is a futile endeavor. For historians,
a well-educated investigation of the past that yields sparse results is more
worthwhile than no investigation at all. Surely this is more than mere selfher or him to pursue historical studies. And neither, as we have noted do
and the possibility of further evidence. Biblical historian V. Philips Long
writes, “Just because absolute objectivity is a chimera does not mean that
we must resign ourselves to absolute subjectivity…” Instead, for Long, the
plausible or probable nature of historical knowledge is “driven by the larger
model of reality that we each embrace” (2002: 9).54 Finally, Collingwood
summarizes this process well when he writes,
…no fact ever has been wholly ascertained, but a fact
may be progressively ascertained; as the labour of
historians goes forward, they come to know more and
more about the facts, and to reject with greater and
them; but no historical statement can ever express the
complete truth about any single fact… This is perfectly
well known to all historians. No historian imagines
that he knows any single fact in its entirety, or that any
historian ever will (1965: 43).55
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So, if historians do not seek unconditional certainty, with what
logic do they proceed? In short, historical logic is inferential.56 There is
not space here to enumerate the depth of this form of logic, as it is at
present an entire subset of study for logicians and has gained popularity
57
Inferences may take the
form of Bayesianism, which seeks to relate the evidence and the hypothesis
by proportion to which they support one another (Day 2008: 37–44).58
Inferences also may utilize explanationism, which attempts to explain
the evidence from the hypothesis (Misak 2017: 25–38).59 Or inferences
evidence.60 None of these logical tools offers certainty, but they do assist us
in reaching more likely historical propositions.
In practice, historians may or may not be conscious of or intentional
about the type of inferential logic they use. But, as they attempt to explain
historical phenomena, they will undoubtedly use inference because it is
an earnest attempt to be reasonable and pragmatic. Inference is reasonable
in that it seeks to make the most sense of the connections between the
evidence and testimony.61 It is pragmatic because it acknowledges that we,
and the historical actors we study, exist in real time and space.62 And in time
and space, we often must use the best logic available to us, which is often
inferential. In fact, we use inferential logic all the time in real life when we
conduct “historical” investigations, such as when we piece together data
to visit suddenly has a closed sign on the door. Historians formalize this
process for events temporally more distant and with fragmented evidence,
especially as the temporal distance increases. But this does not mean that
our hypotheses are without logical foundation. While this sort of logic will
not appease the hardline empiricist, it provides workable rationales for
understanding the past.63
To return to the example of Hezekiah’s run-in with the neoAssyrian army, archaeological digs in Jerusalem remain limited, and we
the one hand, there are strictures to what we will be able to say about
this event, as we have mentioned above. But on the other hand, it is an
important inquiry for the guild to pursue due to the bearing it has on
everything from the redaction of the Deuteronomistic History, the reliability
of the Old Testament as scripture, and what causes mighty empires to fall.
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And, because of this importance, biblical historians and Assyriologists alike
will continue to pursue it. They will do so by drawing conclusions that may
appear to be gospel truth given the depth of their research and conviction
in their writing, but that all know will be contingent upon the dialogue of
the guild and further evidence.
Conclusion
A common thread among philosophers of history is that the
discipline concerns what it means to be human.64 Although we may take
natural phenomena into account of our histories, we will only do so in so
far as these phenomena relate to the actions of humans. Herein lies history’s
distinctiveness from other sciences. Human behavior may at times occur
in predictable patterns. It may also appear in unique, particular events. Of
course, we study history to shape the present, and to understand why the
present is the way that it is. Yet we also study history to discover why we,
as human beings, are the way that we are in all of our universalities and
particularities. It is this foundational assumption of history that I hope ties
together the preceding analysis and encourages us to continue to pursue
historical-critical scholarship.
Because history deals with other humans, this requires historical
respect towards our subjects. We must recognize that, though years (and,
in the case of biblical studies, millennia) separate us, we share the same
human condition. And, as it concerns biblical theology, we share with
historical actors and authors the same relationship to the God we claim
to be constant throughout the ages. Such an approach requires us to place
modernist arrogance to the side and encounter the past with questions,
understanding, and respect. Even though we cannot deny our interpretations
in the act of writing history, the historical-critical approach necessitates that
we do our best to study the linguistic and thought-worlds of the past, and
sympathetically assume that those who left traces of their time intend to
communicate something about the events of their lives. In doing so, we
must allow the evidence to set the boundaries of our interpretations.
In the present dialogues about the past, historians must continue
to see their work as a humanistic enterprise. Historians (and in our case,
biblical scholars) are bound to respect the humanness of our interlocutors,
both ideological comrade and foe. Since our branch of knowledge is
defeasible and is so heavily dependent upon interpretation, it requires a
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community of those committed to understanding more about the past. And
in these dialogues, perhaps we will learn more about who we are now.
Critics of the historical-critical approach are correct when they
note that the Bible is not history as we currently know the discipline of
history. Though historical materials exist within it, and sections such as
corpus of the Bible are too diverse to come close to the Rankean vision
of professional historiography. Rankean historiography will also not tell
us directly about God or divine revelation.65 Yet simply because the texts
were not written within the parameters of our current understanding of
history, does not mean we should avoid historical analysis when studying
the text. It is my belief that historical study of the biblical text arises from
it. A dominant characteristic of the Judeo-Christian faiths, against many of
the religions around which these emerged, is the belief that humanity is
valuable to God and, therefore, humans ought to respect the image of God
(Gen 1:26–27) found in other humans. The study of history in the West,
then, is an extension of this belief. Ranke and many of his successors were
theists who sought to provide dignity to the actors of the past whose stories
had been blurred by the lenses of Romantic narrators. And for the modern
Western world shaped by Judeo-Christian values (although we now might
also add to “secular humanism,” no doubt emerging from such values
in the West), we must continue to investigate the truth of the past with
respect for these image-bearers who can no longer speak. Not only will we
demonstrate an interest in antiquity for its own sake, but perhaps we will
learn our own lessons along the way, given that modern humans are still
endowed with the gifts and pitfalls of being human.65
In biblical studies, this means that the various branches of historical
criticism still hold value. Historians and archaeologists will continue to
ask, “Did it actually happen this way?” when reading biblical narratives to
understand the actors, or at least the writers who chose to portray historical
actions in certain fashions. They will also, perhaps more constructively,66
assist us with detailing the practical context of daily life in biblical eras. In
source and form criticisms, we can begin to understand the emphases of
the earliest communities that produced and uttered this literature, as well
as the editors and their communities who thought it important to keep these
traditions and form them into a new creation. Textual critics will enable us
to understand the earliest religious leaders who transmitted, and sometimes
altered, texts for particular reasons. In short, these different historical-

holland : whY bother with historiCal CritiCisM?

305

critical methodologies will enable us to understand human actions, and in
so doing, teach us something about our own human nature.
Perdue, though critical of the aims of historical criticism, concedes
that it is necessary to understand the human aspects of the Bible. The wellrounded biblical critic must understand, not only the texts left behind
by those of the past, but their authors and actors as well. He writes, “To
deny one in favor of the other [historicality and the language of the text]
or to privilege one while subordinating the other runs counter to what is
fundamentally true about what it means to be human. Thus, history and text
belong together” (1994: 303–304). I hope that underscoring this sentiment
aids our discipline, however small, in creating a body of scholars who are
able to complement one another’s approaches and therefore further our
encounters the God of Israel.
End Notes
1
In writing about the legacy of the literal interpretation of scripture
by the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, Frei writes, “…historical
criticism and biblical theology made for decidedly strained company”
(1974: 8.)
2
Practitioners of these methodologies may object to being
lumped together, but I wish to focus here on the reticence with which they
approach traditional historical criticism. Carroll 1998, Jasper 1998, and
Longman 1999 are helpful introductions to these issues. Childs notably
wishes to differentiate his canonical approach from postmodern literary
criticism because it fails to see the importance of the biblical text within the
history of the communities where the text is authoritative (1979: 74).
3
Alter attacks the speculative nature of “excavative” approaches,
that look behind the text for meaning (1981: 13–14). Johnson Lim is more
foreboding in his assertion that historical criticism may soon become a relic
of the past (2000: 252–271).
4
Barton 1998: 9–20; Miller 1999: 356–372; and Krentz 2002:
48–54 serve as overviews of the disciplines that fall under the rubric of
historical criticism.
5
In my primary area of research, the contextual approach of the
Old Testament, I think of Samuel Sandmel’s warning about “parallelomania.”
See Sandmel 1962: 1–13. Within biblical theology, the so-called “Biblical
Theology” movement in particular has come under an insuperable attack.
For a stringent review of this movement and its weaknesses, see Barr 1976:
1–17. See also Brueggemann 1997: 42–60.
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6
Thus, I count myself with those whom Lim says call “for a
synthesis of traditional methodologies and contemporary theories” (2000:

is apparent in much of his work. I would also add the notable example
of Rolf Rentdorff, who also contends for a blending of diachronic and
synchronic methodologies. For Barton, 1999: 427–438 and 2007: 187–90.
For Rentdorff, see 1999: 67.
7
Zammito acknowledges the challenge of whether we can
speak of a theory in the philosophy of history, but contends with a large
majority of practitioners that we must move to construct such ideas (2011:
63–84). In this essay, I do not wish to get bogged down in the details of
the philosophy of history. But I do desire to elucidate guiding principles of
practicing historians.
8
Younger’s own essay here is one of these rare examples. There are
also some examples within the volume to which Younger contributes. Yet

of history as interpretation and the phenomenon of testimony (typically in
references to the minimalist/maximalist debates). Here I attempt to provide
a foundation for biblical critics to understand the aims of historical criticism
as explained by philosophers of history. Since, in my experience, literary
critics and historical critics often talk past one another, I hope this essay will
assist us to have more mutual understanding between these camps. Two
helpful introductions to the history of historical criticism of the Bible and
its varying approaches appear in this volume from colleagues Hayes and
Miller (Hayes 1999: 7–42; Miller 1999: 356–372).
9
Here I would like to take up David Steinmetz’s challenge to
develop “a hermeneutical theory adequate to the nature of the text which
it is interpretating” (1980: 38). Steinmetz is among those who contend that
historical criticism is not obsolete but is in need of repair for a return to a
holistic (for him, “Medieval”) model of biblical interpretation.
10
See Adam 1995: 32–35; Brueggemann 1997: 8–14; Prickett
1986: 24–25.
11
See Adam 1995: 4; Brueggemann 1997: 8–14; Perdue 1994:
19–20. Ankersmit has notably taken up this claim within the philosophy of
history. See Ankersmit 1989: 137–153 and 1990: 287.
12
Admittedly, most of us learned to eliminate equivocation
from our writing, which likely contributes to this phenomenon in much
historiography. For example, Gardiner, though allowing for some room for
error in hypotheses elsewhere (129), asserts that historians should “insist
that their formulation represent the end of historical inquiry, not that they
are stages on the journey toward that end” (1961: 95–96).
13
Walsh also appropriates a more general notion of science in
1967: 35–37.

holland : whY bother with historiCal CritiCisM?

307

14
Collingwood’s thoughts on this matter are dense, but particular
claims about the relationship between history and science can be found in
the following: 1965: 1–10, 234, 305, 318; 1965: 32, 48–49, 136.
15
The relationship between history and science is a preoccupation
of most of Gardiner’s work, but his most essential viewpoints can be seen
on pages 28–64. See also Walsh 1967: 18, 25, 30–47.
16

theory of “re-enactment,” in which the historian is called upon to inhabit
the particular thought world of a historical subject (2014: 282–302). One
can discern this theme throughout Collinwood’s Idea, but these pages
constitute the most concentrated section on re-enactment in this book.
Day recognizes similarities between re-enactment and a fully empathetic
rational approach, acknowledging instead the interplay of reason and
feelings. Day also stresses that Collingwood has pressed reason too far as a
totalizing feature of history (2008: 128–129).
17
See also Shoemaker’s point in this regard on interpretation of
Collingwood’s “re-enactment” phenomenon in 1969: 107. See also Bloch
2017: 35.
18

some appeal in Johann Gottfried von Herder’s concept of Einfühlung in
theological study, though he is also frustrated that Herder left the concept
fully unexplained (1974: 184–92, 321).
19
From the perspective of biblical studies, see a similar sentiment
in Krentz 2002: 47.
20
As mentioned above, there are many essays within V. Philips
Long’s volume on ancient Israelite historiography dealing with this issue
of history writing because of long-running debates between so-called
“minimalists” and “maximalists.” Many of these essays are found in 1999:
142–278.
21
White indicates the disagreement among historians about
causation and how to interpret is the difference between history and “the
sciences,” where there is more agreement on methodology. This is a narrow

is true. White’s point is to enumerate the different approaches to historical
explanation (1973: 12–13). In some ways, Levin anticipates White’s analysis,
but he clearly believes that the best history writing combines literary artistry
and historical accuracy (1967: 1–33).
22
Note White’s own admittance to writing from an “Ironic
condition” as he understands nineteenth-century European historiography

(to my knowledge) to extrapolate on the concept of interpretation in history.
For example, see Santayana in the early 20th century (2021: 239–40).
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23
Although I could note several remarkable examples, I will
mention only Scholz 2007 and McCauley 2020.
24
Day resists such an idea, however. For him, it is part and parcel of
writing and reading history to assume that the historian is “not omniscient”
and does not hold the only true interpretation 2008: 179.
25

1984.

Lyotard’s most well-known work in English appears in Lyotard

26
Although a remarkable work in many respects, Eichrodt’s
theology (1961) was frequently criticized for a singular focus on the theme
of covenant at the expense of a depth of other images he could have used.
27
See also Gardiner, where he notes that cause is a matter of
perspective, not something out there for the historian to grasp (1961: 109).
28
See Jenkins’s reading of Derrida and his “emancipatory” aims
(2000: 192).
29
Jenkins writes the provocative statement, “To make (to realize) a
meaning, to bring a meaning into the world is ultimately an act of violence…”
(Jenkins 2000: 192). Presumably, to write history in the modernist vein is to
assume an advantaged stance and thus act (however unintentionally) with
violence towards those not of the same level of privilege.
30
See also Evans 1997: 128–129. Evans also adds the suffrage
movement as an example.
31

Jenkins counters that postmodernism does not deny the reality

way, Evans, in my opinion, strikes at the more pertinent point that, in order to
address injustice, we must be able to communicate and understand history
in a meaningful way. For a reading sympathetic to Evans, see Zammito
2011.
32
It is important to note that, within their own society, biblical
writers were privileged. But, when writing on behalf of their people, biblical

geopolitics, dependent upon their survival and thriving only at the hands of
is history in the modernist, Rankean sense. It is debatable as to whether it
even functions as history in the same sense as Herodotus and Thucydides.
For attempts to debate this particular issue, see the collection of essays on
pages 461–578 of Long 1999. But Aleida Assmann’s studies on the memory
of memory and history. (2008: 49–72) See also Halpern 1998: 276–277.
33
In addition to these points, Appleby, Hunt, and Jacob accept
that narrative can shape meaning, but do not wholesale concede that the

postmodernism has in fact crafted its own narrative, thus undermining its
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more radical claims about narrative and meaning. Appleby et. al. 1994:
235–36.
34

Within biblical studies, see Prickett 1986: 24.

35
In the broader discipline of the philosophy of history, Jenkins
largely follows Derrida to claim that a postmodern view of history is
“anti-representational” (2000: 185). Outside of postmodernism, author’s
intention remains a concern of Brevard Childs, who distances himself from

Perdue 1994: 153–154.
36
Day is correct that, when we make sense of a literary product,
“we assign meaning and intention together” (2008: 138). Keith Windschuttle
similarly critiques White’s Metahistory by claiming that literary devices do
not encroach upon the deepest structures of language. He writes, “White

(1996: 241).
37
Maza notes that contemporary historians assume the critiques
of White and the postmodernists, but continue to write about the past as
“compelling, fact-based stories” (2017: 233).
38
In an opaque statement, Ankersmit takes the approach that
evidence is more like a painter’s brushstroke that puts constraints on
a historian responding to the discovery of this evidence than it is like a
magnifying glass into the past (1989: 146). Zagorin’s response to Ankersmit
on this point is clearer and more in line with what I maintain here (1990,
272). See also cautions in the interpretation of evidence in Day 2008, 159–
62.
39
See also Collingwood 2014: 241, 316; Evans 1997: 91, 126;
Roberts 1996: 265.
40
For an understanding of this issue within Old Testament studies,
see Deist 1999: 373–390.
41
This concept, and the related idea of “colligation,” trace their
origins to the philosopher and scientist William Whewell. For a detailed
application of colligation to the philosophy of history, see Roberts 1996:
16–37.
42
Roberts writes, “The greatest explanatory power… is gained
neither by counting more instances nor by manipulation; it is gained by
describing the connection between the two terms of the correlation” (1996:
25). For a review of causation in the philosophy of history, see Tucker
2011a: 99–108; ibid., 2011b: 220–30; Maza 2017: 157–98.
43
For the Assyrian perspective of Sennacherib’s siege of Jerusalem,
see COS §2.119B. Regarding the archaeological data of Jerusalem in this
period, especially the expansion of the city during Hezekiah’s reign, see
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realia surrounding Hezekiah that has been discovered in Jerusalem, see
Ngo 2021.
44

For example, see Lemche 1999.

45

For example, see Kitchen 2001: 50–51.

46

For a concise summary of Ranke’s method, see Evans 1997:

15–17.

47
For this alternative view of Ranke, I am indebted to Day 2008:
5–9 and Tucker 2004: 68–85. Baruch Halpern strikes a similar chord in
1998: 9–10.
48
In their defense of the testimony of the Bible as a legitimate
source for historical reconstruction, Provan, Long, and Longman also
recognize the distinction between Ranke’s program and the positivism
introduced by Comte (Provan et. al. 2003: 21–24, 38–43).
49

This comment is inspired by Day 2008: 21.

50
The understanding of historical conclusions as preliminary
appears prominently in Appleby et. al 1994: 284; Collingwood 2014: 248.
51
Since adherents to these methodologies differ in their approach,
I intentionally refrain from using Derrida’s rallying cry of there being
“nothing outside the text.” But perhaps Jenkins’s interpretation of this slogan
is applicable to all, namely that we cannot pretend to know that the text is
pointing to realities beyond itself (2000: 190).
52

In particular, see Adam 1995: 5, 20; Jenkins 2000: 187–88, 193.

53
Day 2008: 148–149. For further explanation of this concept, see
Tucker 2004: 197–99.
54

See also Miller 1999: 357.

55
Or, the ever-pithy Santayana, who writes, “History is always
wrong, and so always needs to be rewritten” (2021: 237). Biblical historian
Baruch Halpern says, “historiography is never accurate.” Halpern uses
the metaphor of a portrait. The painter will not get every detail correct in
capturing reality, but will do his or her best to paint reality from his or her
perspective. In the same way, the historian cannot capture the reality of the
past in every detail and will be led by an interpretive lens, but must still
strive to understand the historical subject as best as possible (1998: 8).
56
Collingwood uses this term as a means of demonstrating how
history is a science in that it pieces together data to draw conclusions, but
historians are not able to empirically observe the events they describe, as
natural scientists do (2014: 50, 251–52, 282). Santayana uses the same
term in 2021: 238.
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57
For an overview of inferential logic as it is presently practiced,
see McClain and Poston 2017.
58

For a helpful introduction to Bayesinaism, see Day 2008: 31–

59

Also see the volume by McClain and Poston above.

37.

60
For a review of these methods, as well as some other lesserknown logical tools for history, see Day and Radick 2011: 87–97.
61

See the discussion of consilience above. Collingwood stresses

concept of re-enactment. I would not go as far as Collingwood in assuming
the transferability of reason between ourselves and historical actors, but I do
believe that, in so far as we share a common human nature with historical
actors and thoroughly study their historical context and thought world, we
might reasonably imagine their actions in history.
62
Gardner especially underscores the practical nature of historical
understanding (1961: 12).
63
See Misak’s similar statement about “the solipsist and the
skeptic” (2017: 25).
64
See Collingwood 2014: 7–14, 315; Collingwood 1965: 44, 123;
Bloch 2017: 26–27, 42, 44, 151; Day 2008: 3, 180; Gardiner 1961: 49–54,
115; Walsh 1967: 18, 22, 25, 31; Berlin 1960: 2, 24; Halpern 1988: 7, 9.
65
Certainly Collingwood is correct in his assessment that history
cannot refer to divine actions (2014: 14). But what it possible, in my
opinion, is that we can understand human experiences of God through
historical criticism of the Bible.
66

comes from Santayana’s statement that, “Those who cannot remember
the past are condemned to repeat it” (2021: 68). In my view, this is only
partially true. In studying the past, we can learn much about our foibles and
the negative side of the human condition. But this stance also neglects that
we can tell history that exalts humanity. Within biblical history, however,
I must qualify that any human triumphs are seen as the result of a human
yielding to God.
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